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 Homelessness is a perennial problem in the United States and has been analyzed 
using many theoretical frameworks.  The issue has also been a contentious one for courts 
and continues to be the subject of numerous suits today.  Many jurisdictions in the United 
States have enacted laws that prevent homeless people from legally existing within those 
jurisdictions; these laws effectively criminalize being homeless.  These statutes have 
spawned lawsuits alleging violations of homeless people‘s rights.  This Comment 
examines homelessness and its interaction with the law through the lens of citizenship.  It 
argues that the legal paradigm in the United States denies homeless people full 
citizenship and membership in communities.  Court decisions that rule on rights-based 
challenges to these laws reinforce the exclusion of the homeless from the public, even 
when they ostensibly rule for homeless plaintiffs, by restricting homeless people‘s ability 
to take advantage of these decisions and denying homeless people the same menu of 
rights that exist for people with residences. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 ―As citizens of this democracy, you are the rulers and the ruled, the law-givers and 






¶1 During the past few years, homelessness in the United States has fluctuated and 
has experienced an increase following the foreclosure crisis.
2
  This increase has 
reinvigorated the many controversial debates surrounding homelessness that have existed 
for so long and have inevitably evaded solutions.
3
  The discourse surrounding 
                                               
* B.A., 2006, University of Minnesota, Morris.  J.D. candidate, 2011, Northwestern University School of 
Law. 
1 ADLAI E. STEVENSON, THE WIT AND WISDOM OF ADLAI STEVENSON 9 (1965). 
2 See Ian Urbina, Running in the Shadows: Recession Drives Surge in Youth Runaways, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
26, 2009, at A1; Peter S. Goodman, Victims of Foreclosure Turn to Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2009, at 
A1; Leslie Kaufman, Record Number of Families Seeking Refuge in Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2008, at 
A35. 
3 Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11302(a) (2000).  The McKinney Act 
defines homeless as: 
(1) an individual who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence; and  
(2) an individual who has a primary nighttime residence that is—  
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homelessness has taken many forms.  Sociologists, for example, have often focused on 
the causes of homelessness, particularly whether homelessness is the result of individual 
behavior and choices or is socially and structurally driven.
4
  Others have attempted to 
quantify issues surrounding homelessness
5
 or discuss the social or charitable programs in 
place to deal with homelessness.
6
  This Comment does not deal with the causes of 
homelessness, but rather addresses the legal structure and theoretical discourses that 
contribute to defining homelessness. 
¶2 This Comment will offer a unique perspective on homelessness and the law 
through the lens of citizenship and political identity.  The legal discourse surrounding 
homelessness does not consider theoretical discussions of citizenship or community.  
Even those legal challenges to anti-homeless measures that have been successful do not 
shift the legal paradigm that excludes the homeless from political community and 
effective citizenship.  Instead, they reinforce the exclusion of the homeless from public 
space and from the definition of public itself. 
¶3 Part II of this Comment is a survey of the laws and legal challenges to laws that 
affect the homeless.  Part III will consider theories in citizenship and the relationship 
between citizenship, social class, and property.  Part IV will argue that the homeless are 
denied full citizenship in the United States, that the legal system and jurisprudence 
surrounding ―the home‖ fundamentally disfavor the homeless, and that the rights-based 
remedies courts have employed are insufficient to shift the paradigm that denies 
citizenship to the homeless. 
¶4 Finally, Part V of this Comment will consider whether the economic crisis may 
have, at least briefly, acted to shift that paradigm by altering the concept of the ―other‖—
that which is excluded from the social definition of belonging or ―us‖—in relation to 
homelessness, and as a result altered the inclusion of the homeless in citizenship. 
¶5 This Comment will argue that legal challenges are unsuccessful in addressing 
homelessness and serve instead to reinforce the exclusion of the homeless from political 
community or citizenship.  While the courts are restrained to a certain extent in their 
ability to restore citizenship to the homeless, courts may be able to help create space for 
the homeless in citizenship by acknowledging the legitimacy of alternatives to traditional 
residences. 
                                                                                                                                            
(A) a supervised publicly or privately operated shelter designed to provide temporary 
living accommodations (including welfare hotels, congregate shelters, and transitional 
housing for the mentally ill);  
(B) an institution that provides a temporary residence for individuals intended to be 
institutionalized; or 
(C) a public or private place not designed for, or ordinarily used as, a regular sleeping 
accommodation for human beings. 
Id. 
4 See, e.g., Thomas Main, How to Think about Homelessness: Balancing Structural and Individual Causes, 
7 J. SOC. DISTRESS & HOMELESS 41 (1998); see also DISAFFILIATED MAN—ESSAYS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 
ON SKID ROW, VAGRANCY, AND OUTSIDERS (H.M. Bahr ed., 1970). 
5 See THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS-SODEXO, HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS SURVEY: A STATUS 
REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICAN CITIES 71–90 (2005), available at 
http://www.usmayors.org/hungersurvey/2005/HH2005FINAL.pdf. 
6 See MARTHA R. BURT ET AL., HOMELESSNESS: PROGRAMS AND THE PEOPLE THEY SERVE (1999), 
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/homelessness.pdf. 
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II. LAWS AND CHALLENGES 
¶6 Laws that disproportionately affect homeless people come in a variety of forms.  
Vagrancy laws, which criminalized certain categories of people, provide one historical 
example.  While these laws never used the term ―homeless,‖ by imposing fines or 
imprisonment on groups such as ―rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go 
about begging,‖ ―common night walkers,‖ and ―persons wandering or strolling around 
from place to place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, [and] 
disorderly persons,‖ vagrancy laws ensured that homeless people were classified as 
criminals and punished for their lack of a residence.
7
 
¶7 Another example, loitering laws, prohibit behavior rather than criminalizing types 
of people, but have a similar effect on homeless people.  Some loitering laws specifically 
target certain behavior (―[l]oiters, remains or wanders about in a public place for the 
purpose of begging‖),8 while others simply prohibit prolonged or purposeless presence in 
public areas.
9
  Other laws prohibit behavior that is associated with homelessness, like 
begging or panhandling.
10
  Many recent laws, referred to as ―anti-camping‖ ordinances, 
prohibit standing, sitting, or lying in public areas.
11
  Unlike vagrancy laws, which made 
the criminalization of the homeless (or ―vagrants‖) explicit, newer laws do not reference 
any particular target group.  These laws can be seen as anti-homeless because they are 
perceived to covertly target the homeless and because enforcement of these laws 
disproportionately affects the homeless.
12
  Moreover, these laws are anti-homeless 
because while they may be phrased in less offensive terms than the now defunct vagrancy 
laws, they nevertheless criminalize the lack of a home in much the same way. 
¶8 In addition to statutes that disproportionately affect the homeless, homeless people 
may also be subject to selective or disproportionate enforcement of laws by the police.  
Challenges to measures that adversely and disproportionately affect the homeless have 
come in various forms, including procedural due process, substantive due process, equal 
protection, and First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and Eighth Amendment 
challenges.
13
  Groups have brought suits challenging statutes that single out the homeless 
both on their face
14
 and as applied.
15
  This Part discusses anti-homeless measures, the 
wide variety of legal challenges that have been used to attempt to overturn them, and 
their respective successes in the courts.  This Comment focuses primarily on the most 




                                               
7 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 158 (1972). 
8 N.Y. Penal Law § 240.35 (1) (2005). 
9 See U.S. ex. rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1974). 
10 See, e.g., Young v. N.Y.C. Transfer Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990). 
11 See, e.g., L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 11.00(m), 41.18(d) (2005). 
12 For example, one would assume that a family picnicking in a public park would not be arrested or 
charged under this kind of law. 
13 See infra Sections II.A.–II.F.1. 
14 See, e.g., Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1996) (challenging an ordinance prohibiting 
sitting or lying in public under the First Amendment). 
15 See, e.g., Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (challenging anti-homeless ordinances 
and their enforcement in Miami); see text accompanying infra note 33. 
16 See infra Section Part II.A.1. 
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A. Procedural Due Process 
¶9 Challenges to anti-homeless ordinances and their enforcement often claim that 
these ordinances deny the homeless procedural due process.  Challenges under the Due 
Process Clause have generally taken one of the following two forms: vagueness or 
overbreadth. 
1. Vagueness 
¶10 In the 1972 case Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, the Supreme Court struck 
down a Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance, which characterized and criminalized, in broad 
terms, a series of groups as ―vagrants‖ subject to arrest, fines, and imprisonment.17  The 
statute identified more than twenty groups as vagrants, including ―rogues and 
vagabonds,‖ ―common drunkards,‖ ―persons wandering or strolling around from place to 
place without any lawful purpose or object,‖ and ―persons able to work but habitually 
living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children.‖18  The Court found that the 
ordinance was unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: 
This ordinance is void for vagueness, both in the sense that it ‗fails to give 
a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct 




¶11 In holding that the law was unconstitutional, the Court found that the 
criminalization of select groups undermined the rule of law.
20
  In rejecting the statute, the 
opinion credited non-conforming behaviors like wandering with promoting American 
values and the right to dissent
21
 and went so far as to poeticize famous wanderers and 
quasi-homeless figures, including Walt Whitman and Henry David Thoreau, who 
embodied that dissenting spirit.
22
  The Court concluded that the law was ―not compatible 
                                               
17 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 158 n.1 (1972).   
Jacksonville Ordinance Codes 26–57 provided at the time of these arrests and convictions 
as follows: ‗Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common 
gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, 
common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, 
wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, 
persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or 
object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and 
habitually spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or 
places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but habitually 
living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants and, 
upon conviction in the Municipal Court shall be punished as provided for Class D 
offenses.‘  
Class D offenses at the time of these arrests and convictions were punishable by ninety days of 
imprisonment, a $500 fine, or both.  Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 162 (internal citations omitted). 
20 Id. at 163. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 164.   
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with our constitutional system‖23 and would subject people to punishment based on the 
whims of the police.
24
  Finally, the Court analogized this kind of vagrancy law to 
oppressive systems of punishment in Russia.
25
 
¶12 When the Supreme Court delivered its decision in Papachristou, vagrancy laws 
were common in nearly every state, although groups had begun to challenge them on a 
number of different grounds.
26
  Since Papachristou, states and municipalities have 
employed new methods of criminalizing homelessness, including, ―anti-camping‖ 
ordinances, which ostensibly punish conduct rather than groups of people.
27
  These laws 
usually are challenged under similar theories to vagrancy laws.
28
 
¶13 For example, loitering laws became common after Papachristou.  Since then, 
general loitering laws have also been found to be unconstitutionally vague.  In United 
States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, the Second Circuit found that a statute stating that a 
person who ―loiters, remains or wanders‖ without apparent reason, under suspicious 
circumstances, and refuses to identify oneself to the police was unconstitutionally vague 
for failing to distinguish licit from illicit behavior and for failing to provide sufficient 
enforcement guidelines.
29
  Loitering ordinances directed at more specific behavior or 
limited to certain time periods, however, have generally been upheld.  Anti-nuisance laws 
                                                                                                                                            
These unwritten amenities have been in part responsible for giving our people the feeling 
of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These amenities have 
dignified the right of dissent and have honored the right to be nonconformists and the 
right to defy submissiveness.  They have encouraged lives of high spirits rather than 
hushed, suffocating silence.   
Id.  The court‘s acceptance, and even celebration, of homelessness and incident behaviors as an alternative 
lifestyle has not survived in more recent decisions regarding laws that impact the homeless.  See Anderson 
v. City of Portland, 2009 WL 2386056, at *10 (D. Or. July 31, 2009).  The District Court in Anderson, 
while finding for the homeless class of plaintiffs, insisted that the plaintiffs homelessness be both 
involuntary and not constitute behavior that society has an interest in preventing (whether or not that 
behavior is otherwise illegal).  Id.  The court‘s insistence on these criteria probably stems, at least in part, 
from a desire to limit the reach of the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition on the criminalization of status.  
However, any narrative validating a homeless lifestyle as a choice has undoubtedly been lost.  See also 
Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1555, 1565 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (relying on the involuntariness of the 
homeless plaintiffs‘ conduct in finding that the city had violated the Eighth Amendment by arresting them 
for behavior such as sleeping, eating, and bathing). 
23 Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 168–69. 
24 Id. at 166–67 (―Where the list of crimes is so all-in-clusive and generalized as the one in this ordinance, 
those convicted may be punished for no more than vindicating affronts to police authority.‖). 
25 Id. at 169. 
26 See, e.g., Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897 (D. Colo. 1969) (finding a vagrancy ordinance 
unconstitutionally vague and a violation of the Equal Protection Clause and substantive due process under 
the Fourteenth Amendment); Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969); Smith v. Hill, 285 
F. Supp. 556 (E.D.N.C. 1968) (finding a vagrancy law from a North Carolina town that disallowed ―tramps, 
vagrants, persons under suspicion who shall be found with no visible means of support‖ from public places 
unconstitutionally vague for failing to sufficiently define the conduct that it criminalized). 
27 See Timothy Zick, Constitutional Displacement, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 515 (2009). 
28 See, e.g., Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1554 (S.D. Fla. 1992); see infra text accompanying 
note 33. 
29 492 F.2d 1166, 1173–74 (2d Cir. 1974); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983) 
(finding a California statute requiring people loitering or wandering on the streets to provide ―credible and 
reliable‖ identification was unconstitutionally vague for failing to sufficiently define ―credible and 
reliable‖); City of Akron v. Effland, 174 N.E.2d 285 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960) (finding an anti-loitering law 
unconstitutional as applied to people waiting on the street). 
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that limit loitering only on Government property, and not in public, may also be more 




¶14 In addition to vagueness claims, courts have also considered theories of 
overbreadth under procedural due process claims.  This claim is more limited in 
constitutional scope than vagueness claims, is brought less often, and is less often 
successful.  Overbreadth challenges are usually seen in the First Amendment context, 
which may explain why they are more rarely used to challenge most anti-homeless laws.  
To be upheld, a facial overbreadth challenge must be directed at laws that touch some 
constitutionally protected conduct.
31
  A statute is overbroad if it substantially burdens 
constitutionally protected conduct and is not sufficiently narrowly tailored.
32
 
¶15 In Pottinger v. City of Miami, a class of homeless plaintiffs brought a § 1983 suit 
against the City of Miami alleging that the city had a ―custom, practice and policy of 
arresting, harassing and otherwise interfering with homeless people for engaging in basic 
activities of daily life—including sleeping and eating-in the public places where they are 
forced to live.‖33  The plaintiffs additionally alleged that the city arrested homeless 
people under various Miami and Florida statutes for participating in the same types of 
life-sustaining conduct.
34
  The plaintiffs challenged the application of these statutes on a 
number of constitutional grounds under both the Federal and Florida Constitutions.
35
  
These challenges included a substantive due process argument under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments,
36
 a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim,
37
 an 





 including the right to travel, an Eighth Amendment challenge alleging 
cruel and unusual punishment and the criminalization of status,
40
 and a state claim of 
malicious abuse of process.
41
  The conduct that the plaintiffs sought to enjoin included 
arrests, sweeps designed to get homeless people out of plain sight, and the burning or 
general destruction of their personal property.
42
 
¶16 The court ultimately found that the plaintiffs‘ rights had been violated under the 
Eighth, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments and granted an injunction based on 
five of the plaintiffs theories: 
                                               
30
 See, e.g., United States v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1970). 
31 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). 
32 Id. 
33 Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1554. 
34 Id.  These statutes criminalized behavior such as standing, loitering, walking, sleeping, and obstructing 
passage on public land.  Id. at 1560. 
35 The plaintiffs did not challenge the statutes in question on their face, but instead only sought to enjoin the 
city from arresting homeless people for ―inoffensive conduct‖ that they are ―forced to perform in public.‖  
Id. 
36 Id. at 1572. 
37 Id. at 1577. 
38 Id. at 1569. 
39 Id. at 1578. 
40 Id. at 1561–62. 
41 Id. at 1565. 
42 Id. at 1555–56. 
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First, plaintiffs have shown that the City has a pattern and practice of 
arresting homeless people for the purpose of driving them from public 
areas. . . .   
 
Second, the City‘s practice of arresting homeless individuals for harmless, 
involuntary conduct which they must perform in public is cruel and 
unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. . . .   
 
Third, such arrests violate plaintiffs‘ due process rights because they reach 
innocent and inoffensive conduct. . . .   
 
Fourth, the City‘s failure to follow its own written procedure for handling 
personal property when seizing or destroying the property of homeless 
individuals violates plaintiffs' fourth amendment rights. . . .  
 
Fifth, the City‘s practice of arresting homeless individuals for performing 
essential, life-sustaining acts in public when they have absolutely no place 
to go effectively infringes on their fundamental right to travel in violation 
of the equal protection clause.
43
 
¶17 Unlike many vagrancy challenges, the procedural due process claim of the 
plaintiffs in Pottinger did not include a vagueness claim.
44
  Instead, the plaintiffs alleged 
that the application of the statutes in question was overbroad and the action authorized 
under them extended beyond the reach of police power.
45
  Because the conduct for which 
the police had arrested plaintiffs was constitutionally protected (in other words, it 
implicated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments), the court found that the statute was 
overbroad as applied because the arrests of the plaintiffs were for ―harmless, inoffensive 
conduct that they are forced to perform in public places.‖46 
¶18 Most courts, however, have rejected due process overbreadth claims.  In Whiting v. 
Town of Westerly, for example, the First Circuit found that a law prohibiting sleeping in 
public areas was not overbroad because sleeping is not a constitutionally protected 
activity.
47
  The court noted that sleeping might sometimes implicate the First 




B. Substantive Due Process Challenges 
¶19 Substantive due process challenges have claimed that anti-homeless measures 
violate a number of fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, including the 
                                               
43 Id. at 1554.  
44 Id. at 1576. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 1577. 
47 Whiting v. Westerly, 942 F.2d 18, 21–22 (1st Cir. 1991); see also Seattle v. Webster, 802 P.2d 1333 
(Wash. 1990); People v. Trantham, 208 Cal. Rptr. 535 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1984). 
48 Whiting, 942 F.2d at 21–22. 
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right to privacy.  Courts have generally rejected substantive due process challenges, 
although some have been successful.  For example, in Roulette v. City of Seattle, the 
court rejected the plaintiffs‘ facial substantive due process claim, as well as their First 
Amendment claim.
49
  The plaintiffs alleged that the Seattle statute that criminalized 
sitting or lying on sidewalks during certain hours was merely a veiled attempt to remove 
homeless people from Seattle‘s commercial areas.50  The court found that because the 
plaintiffs challenged the statute on its face and not its application, and because the city 
presented legitimate public safety reasons for the ordinance, the plaintiffs‘ substantive 
due process claims failed.
51
 
¶20 Other courts, however, have sometimes accepted substantive due process claims 
even in the face of government interests like public safety.  Pottinger v. City of Miami is 
such a case, which also presents a number of other successful legal theories.
52
  
¶21 In Pottinger, the plaintiffs brought substantive due process claims alleging that the 
application of local and state ordinances against, for example, sleeping, violated their 
fundamental right to travel and to ―engage in life sustaining activities in public.‖53  The 
court rejected that ―engaging in life sustaining activities‖ was a fundamental right.54  
However, it recognized that the right to travel was guaranteed by the Constitution and 
found that arresting people for sleeping in public violated the fundamental rights to travel 
and to freedom of movement.
55
  The ordinances penalized travel by denying plaintiffs the 
―necessities of life‖ and a place where they can lawfully be.56  The court held that the city 
had a legitimate but not compelling interest in the aesthetics of its public spaces, crime 
prevention and promoting business, but that its ordinances and the methods of enforcing 
them were not the least intrusive manner of enforcing that interest.
57
  The court also 
rejected crime prevention as a possible compelling interest, holding that criminality could 
not be ascribed to the homeless by virtue of their homelessness.
58
 
¶22 Claims alleging violations of the fundamental right to travel or to exercise freedom 
of movement (as the Plaintiffs‘ claim in Pottinger did) are some of the most common and 
most frequently successful claims brought under substantive due process theories.  The 
Supreme Court has recognized numerous times that the right to interstate travel is a 
fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny.
59
  Both the Supreme Court and many lower 
                                               




 Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992). 
53 Id. at 1578. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 1580. 
56 Id. at 1563.  Cf. Mem‘l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (holding that denying medical care 
burdens the fundamental right to travel). 
57 Id. at 1581–82. 
58 Id. at 1582.  As the court writes: 
The City further argues that it would be disingenuous to ignore the criminal element 
among the homeless.  However, there is a criminal element among all of society, not just 
among the homeless.  The United States Supreme Court, in rejecting the idea that 
criminality can be ascribed to the unfortunate, stated that no one can seriously contend 
that a person without funds and without a job constitutes a ‗moral pestilence.‘ 
Id. (citing Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941)). 
59 See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Edwards v. California, 314 
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courts, however, have been more reluctant to find that anti-homeless measures violate the 
fundamental right to travel.  In Anderson v. Portland, while the district court denied a 
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs‘ Eighth Amendment and unequal application under the 
Equal Protection Clause claims, it granted summary judgment to dismiss their 
fundamental right to travel claim, stating: 
I fail to discern how the alleged actions of the City interfere with 
plaintiffs‘ constitutional right to travel. Plaintiffs allege that police officers 
have told them to ―move along‖ when sleeping in public and conducted 
camp clean-ups and seized their property.  However, plaintiffs do not 
allege that the City has attempted to restrain their movement, prevented 
them from traveling to or from the City, or excluded them from certain 
areas of the City.
60
 
¶23 Other courts, however, have accepted challenges to statutes or practices directed at 
the homeless under right to travel theories.
61
  In Streetwatch v. National Railroad 
Passenger Corporation, the district court for the Southern District of New York granted a 
preliminary injunction of the arrests of people in a New York Amtrak station based in 
part on the implication of the fundamental right to freedom of movement in the arrests.
62
  
The court found that a policy of the Amtrak police to eject or arrest people without 
explanation who had been ―hanging around the station for too long,‖ unconstitutionally 
infringed on the fundamental right to travel.
63
 
C. Equal Protection Challenges 
¶24 The Supreme Court has never ruled on whether the homeless comprise a protected 
class that warrants heightened scrutiny for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment 





 do not constitute protected classes under the Fourteenth Amendment.  As a 
result, even facial classifications based on homelessness or wealth need only pass a 
rational basis test.  While challenges to anti-homeless measures continue to be brought 
under the Equal Protection Clause, they are largely unsuccessful.
66
 
                                                                                                                                            
U.S. 160 (1941) (Couglas, William J., concurring); Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283 (1849) (Taney, J., 
dissenting). 
60 Anderson v. City of Portland, 2009 WL 2386056, at *10 (D. Or. July 31, 2009). 
61 See, e.g., Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 392–94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), rev’d, 892 P.2d 
1145 (Cal. 1995); Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1554. 
62 Streetwatch v. Nat‘l R.R. Passenger Corp., 875 F. Supp. 1055, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
63 Id. 
64 See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450 (1988) (holding that a classification based on wealth 
does not merit heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause and, thus, that a statute charging a flat 
fee for elementary school bus service did not violate the Equal Protection Clause); San Antonio Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that an elementary school financing system based on 
property taxes was not unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause). 
65 See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (holding that a forcible entry and detainer act was not 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, and that distinctions based on home ownership or 
tenancy do not receive heightened scrutiny). 
66 Some lower courts have found that vagrancy laws, for example, violate the Equal Protection Clause 
because they are arbitrary and unequally enforced.  See, e.g., Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897 (D. 
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¶25 In Davison v. City of Tucson, for example, the plaintiffs alleged that the homeless 
as a class were being discriminated against through selectively enforced criminal trespass 
laws.
67
  These laws were only enforced against a particular encampment of homeless 
people who had been camping on city property for more than ten years.
68
  Relying on the 
state supreme court‘s rejection of wealth and housing as legitimate bases for suspect 
classifications, the court found that the homeless were not a protected class for the 
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.
69
  The Court further held that based on the city‘s 
legitimate interests in preventing crime, maintaining health and sanitation, and avoiding 
liability, it was unlikely that the city‘s actions would fail the rational basis test.70 
D.  First Amendment Challenges 
¶26 Challenges to measures that allegedly violate the homeless‘ right to free speech 
often apply to a broader group than just the homeless.  Challenges to panhandling or 
soliciting laws based on the right to free political speech under the First Amendment, for 
example, are not limited to the homeless alone. 
¶27 Two Second Circuit cases illustrate typical free speech challenges brought against 
panhandling or soliciting laws.  In Young v. New York City Transit Authority, the Second 
Circuit held that New York City‘s prohibition on panhandling in subways did not violate 
the First Amendment because panhandling was commercial, not political, speech, and the 
city had an interest in preventing fear on the subway.
71
  However, three years later, the 
same court held in Loper v. New York City Police Department that begging was 
communicative or expressive, provided that it is conducted in a traditional public forum 
(outside of the subway system).
72
  Further, the court held that the city did not present a 
compelling interest sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass muster under the First 
Amendment.
73
  Because the Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment protects 
solicitation of charitable donations.
74
  As a result, many challenges focus on the issue of 




¶28 At least one First Amendment challenge focused on provisions directed 
specifically at homeless people.  In Roulette v. City of Seattle, a group of homeless 
persons and their advocates invoked § 1983 to challenge the constitutionality of a law 
that forbade sitting or lying down on the sidewalk between 7:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m.
76
  The 
                                                                                                                                            
Colo. 1969) (holding that a vagrancy ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause without determining 
whether poverty or homelessness are protected classes deserving of heightened scrutiny). 
67 Davison v. City of Tuscon, 924 F. Supp. 989, 993 (D. Ariz. 1996). 
68 Id. at 991. 
69 Id. at 993 (citing Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450 (1988) and Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 
56 (1972)). 
70 Davison, 924 F. Supp. at 993. 
71 Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990). 
72 Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993). 
73 Id. 
74 Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). 
75 See Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Laws Regulating Begging, Panhandling, or Similar Activity by Poor 
or Homeless Persons, 7 A.L.R. 5TH 455 (2006). 
76 Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300, 302 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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plaintiffs claimed that the statute was unconstitutional on both free speech and 
substantive due process grounds.
77
 
¶29 Their free speech claim alleged that the statute was a facial violation of the First 
Amendment; that is, that the ordinance itself—not just particular applications of it—
violated the protection of symbolic speech articulated in Spence v. Washington.
78
  The 
Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs‘ claim that the statute violated the First Amendment 
on its face, finding that sitting and lying down were not integrally connected to 
expression.
79
  Because almost any conduct can be expressive in some situation, for a 
facial attack to succeed the challenged statute must narrowly target the expressive 
behavior.
80
  The court did not, however, foreclose an as applied challenge. 
E. Fourth Amendment Challenges 
¶30 The Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures has 
been used to challenge a number of anti-homeless measures.  Generally, this theory 
cannot be used to attack anti-camping ordinances on their face because these ordinances 
do not directly contemplate searches.  However, in enforcing these ordinances and other 
policies or statutes, law enforcement officers often appropriate or destroy the belongings 
of the homeless, leading to potentially viable Fourth Amendment claims. 
¶31 Police action may only be classified as a ―search‖ for Fourth Amendment purposes 
if (1) the person has demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy surrounding the 




¶32 The majority of courts considering the constitutionality of police searches and the 
collection or destruction of the property of the homeless have held that these actions do 
not constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment because the homeless have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  In Whiting v. State, for example, the Maryland Court 
of Appeals held that while the homeless defendant demonstrated a subjective expectation 
of privacy in the building in which he was squatting, that expectation was not one that 
society recognizes as reasonable.
82
  The court cited lack of possessory interest, lack of 
power to exclude, and lack of exclusive control in the property as factors in its decision.
83
 
¶33 Some courts have found that the homeless have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in homeless shelters, or at least in certain areas of homeless shelters.
84
  However, 
                                               
77 Id. at 302, 305. 
78 Id. at 302–303 (―The First Amendment protects not only the expression of ideas through printed or 
spoken words, but also symbolic speech—nonverbal ‗activity . . . sufficiently imbued with elements of 
communication.‘‖). 
79 Id. at 305. 
80 Id. 
81 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  A person has demonstrated 
a subjective expectation of privacy when she exhibits an intention to keep objects, activities or statements 
private.  Id. 
82 Whiting v. State, 885 A.2d 785, 799–801 (Md. 2005). 
83 Id. 
84 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Unknown Agents of U.S. Marshals Serv., 791 F. Supp. 1 
(D.D.C. 1992). 
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many courts have not been willing to extend Fourth Amendment protection to closed 
containers (like lockers) used only by the plaintiff or defendant in homeless shelters.
85
 
¶34 There are very few courts that have found that the Fourth Amendment covers 
personal property outside of homeless shelters.  Most courts have held that the homeless 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy on public property or on private property 
where they have no lawful right to be. 
¶35 The Pottinger court, however, found the city of Miami liable on Fourth 
Amendment grounds due to its treatment of the homeless plaintiff‘s belongings.86  The 
court held that ―the gathering and destruction of class members‘ personal property is a 
meaningful interference with their possessory interest in that property.‖87  In addition, the 
court also held that: (1) the plaintiffs demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy in 
their belongings by arranging and protecting them so as to distinguish them from 
abandoned property; and, (2) that that expectation of privacy was reasonable, even 
though the property in question was on public land, because the property of the homeless 




F. Eighth Amendment Challenges 
¶36 Eighth Amendment challenges alleging cruel and unusual punishment have been 
almost universally unsuccessful.  In Davison v. City of Tucson, a class of plaintiffs 
challenged a resolution disbanding ―Mountain Homeless Campground and Other 
Homeless Encampments‖ that had existed on public lands for ten years.89  The plaintiffs 
asked the court for a preliminary injunction to prevent the destruction of their homes.  
The plaintiffs alleged violations of their Eighth Amendment rights and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
90
  The court summarily disposed of the 
Eighth Amendment claim, finding that the plaintiffs had not been convicted of crimes so 




1. Eighth Amendment Prohibition on the Criminalization of Status 
¶37 Because the Supreme Court found in Papachristou that vagrancy laws are 
unconstitutionally vague,
92
 municipalities have shifted the ways in which they exclude 
the homeless.  Instead of laws that criminalize broad groups of people by labeling them 
―vagrants,‖ cities began to criminalize a broad list of behavior using statutes often 
                                               
85 See People v. McClain, 814 N.Y.S.2d 738 (N.Y. 2006) (holding that the defendant did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his locker because the shelter‘s guidelines permitted searches and the 
guidelines were posted). 
86 Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1571 (S.D. Fla. 1992).   
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 1571–72. 
89 Davison v. City of Tuscon, 924 F. Supp. 989, 991 (D. Ariz. 1996). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 992–93. 
92 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 158 (1972); see supra text accompanying notes 17–
25. 
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referred to as ―anti-camping‖ ordinances.93  These laws usually prohibit sleeping, sitting, 
and lying down, among other things, during certain times or in certain areas of the city.  
The most restrictive of these laws prohibit all of these activities at all times anywhere 
within the city limits.
94
  Rather than criminalizing amorphous behaviors, they bring about 




¶38 These anti-homeless measures have led to legal challenges based on new legal 
arguments.  The most successful of these new arguments utilizes the prohibition of the 
criminalization of status under the Eighth Amendment.
96
  The Supreme Court has held 





 and also ―imposes substantive limits on what can be made 
criminal.‖99  For example, behavior, such as drug possession, may be criminalized while 
status, such as drug addiction, may not.
100
  While Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual 
punishment challenges to anti-homeless statutes have generally failed,
101
 challenges 
under the prohibition of criminalization of status have been somewhat more successful.
102
  
For example, the Eighth Amendment prohibition on the criminalization of status was 
used successfully to challenge vagrancy laws.
103
  These statutes, which criminalize 
drunkards, walkers, rogues and vagabonds, were explicitly directed toward statuses and 
not behaviors (in other words, the statutes target drunkards, not drinking).
104
  The use of 
Eighth Amendment theories for anti-camping ordinances or other more modern statutes, 
however, stretch the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to apply to certain conduct (like 
sleeping), and is therefore much more controversial.
105
  While this theory still fails more 
                                               
93 See, e.g., cases cited infra note 106. 
94 See Jones v. Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2006) (vacated). 
No person shall sit, lie or sleep in or upon any street, sidewalk or other public way. 
 
The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to persons sitting on the curb portion of any 
sidewalk or street while attending or viewing any parade permitted under the provisions of 
Section 103.111 of Article 2, Chapter X of this Code; nor shall the provisions of this 
subsection supply [sic] to persons sitting upon benches or other seating facilities provided for 
such purpose by municipal authority by this Code... 
 
A violation of section 41.18(d) is punishable by a fine of up to $1000 and/or imprisonment of 
up to six months. 
L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 11.00(m), 41.18(d) (2005). 
95 See, e.g., L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 11.00(m), 41.18(d). 
96 See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); see discussion infra Section II.F.1.a. 
97 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
98 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).  
99 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977) (emphasis added). 
100 See generally Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
101 See supra Section F. 
102 See Jones v. Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006); Anderson v. Portland, No. 08-1447-AA, 
2009 WL 2386056, at *7 (D. Or. July 31, 2009); Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1561 (S.D. Fla. 
1992). 
103 Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (finding that a vagrancy statute was 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment because it criminalized status).   
104 See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 158 (1972).   
105 See, e.g., Alegata v. Commonwealth, 231 N.E.2d 201, 207 (Mass. 1967) (―Idleness and poverty should 
not be treated as a criminal offence.‖); Parker v. Municipal Judge of Las Vegas, 427 P.2d 642, 644 (Nev. 
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i) Robinson v. California, the Supreme Court, and the Criminalization of Status 
¶39 The criminalization of status was not held unconstitutional until the Supreme 
Court‘s 1962 decision, Robinson v. California.107  In Robinson, the Supreme Court found 
that criminalizing a status violated the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishment.  The California statute in question criminalized addiction to 
narcotics, even if the suspect had never used or possessed narcotics within the state.
108
  
The Court concluded that any law that criminalized a status rather than an act could not 
stand under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
109
  However, six years later in 
Powell v. State of Texas, the Court made it clear that this prohibition extended only to 
status, and that behavior connected to a status could be criminalized.
110
  Subsequently, 
courts that have found that anti-camping statutes violate the Eighth Amendment and that 
have extended the Robinson rule to apply to conduct integral to status have universally 
limited their holdings to involuntary conduct.
111
  The most recent challenges to anti-




ii) Jones v. Los Angeles: The Ninth Circuit 
¶40 In Jones v. Los Angeles, a circuit court found, for the first time, that the Eighth 
Amendment‘s prohibition on the criminalization of status extended to anti-camping 
ordinances.
113
  The Ninth Circuit held that the limits on the criminalization of status from 
Robinson extended to conduct that is an ―integral aspect of that status.‖114  The court 
relied on the Supreme Court‘s decisions in Robinson and Powell, finding that the dissent 
                                                                                                                                            
1967) (―It simply is not a crime to be unemployed, without funds, and in a public place. To punish the 
unfortunate for this circumstance debases society.‖); see also Martin R. Gardner, Rethinking Robinson v. 
California in The Wake of Jones v. Los Angeles: Avoiding The “Demise Of The Criminal Law” by 
Attending to “Punishment”, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (2008). 
106 See, e.g., Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006); Anderson v. Portland, No. 08-
1447-AA, 2009 WL 2386056 (D. Or. July 31, 2009); Lehr v. City of Sacramento, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1218 
(E.D. Cal. 2009).   
107 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
108
 CAL., HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (1964) (repealed 1972). 
109 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666 (―But, in the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a 
criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.‖). 
110 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532–33 (1968) (declining to extend the holding in Robinson to acts that 
stem from conditions or statuses).  The Court held that the act of being drunk in public, although it might 
be considered incident to the status of alcoholism (assuming alcoholism is a status), could constitutionally 
be criminalized and did not affect an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment violation.  Id. 
111 See Jones, 444 F.3d at 1137; Anderson v. Portland, No. 08-1447-AA, 2009 WL 2386056, at *7 (D. Or. 
July 31, 2009); Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1561 (S.D. Fla. 1992). 
112 See Anderson v. Portland, No. 08-1447-AA, 2009 WL 2386056 (D. Or. July 31, 2009); Lehr v. City of 
Sacramento, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
113 Jones, 444 F.3d. at 1137. 
114 Id. at 1132 (―The City could not expressly criminalize the status of homelessness by making it a crime to 
be homeless without violating the Eighth Amendment, nor can it criminalize acts that are an integral aspect 
of that status.‖). 
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and the concurrence in Powell both suggested that, in certain circumstances, 
criminalizing conduct connected to status would also be unconstitutional under the Eight 
and Fourteenth Amendments.
115
  Los Angeles could not criminalize being homeless as a 
status, nor could it criminalize ―sitting, lying, or sleeping on public streets and sidewalks 
at all times and in all places within Los Angeles‘s city limits.‖116 
¶41 The court rested its holding on the fact that the homeless appellants had no choice 
but to be and sleep on the streets and thus concluded, ―[e]ven if Appellants‘ past 
volitional acts contributed to their current need to sit, lie, and sleep on public sidewalks at 
night, those acts are not sufficiently proximate to the conduct at issue here for the 
imposition of penal sanctions to be permissible.‖117  The court‘s decision in Jones is 
novel for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, but it also set the stage for later 
challenges by homeless people based on the criminalization of status.  The court 
recognized the harm anti-camping statutes can inflict on homeless people.  However, by 
couching its decision within a requirement of involuntariness, the court limited both the 
conditions under which plaintiffs could succeed and the extent to which the city was 
required to treat homeless people as free members of its community.  Other cases would 
follow suit. 
iii) Anderson v. City of Portland 
¶42 In Anderson v. City of Portland, the District Court of Oregon denied a motion to 
dismiss a suit challenging Portland‘s anti-camping ordinance which prohibited 
establishing or maintaining a temporary place to live.
118
  The plaintiffs, labeled by the 
court as ―involuntarily homeless,‖ challenged the enforcement.119  The ordinance 
prohibited camping for the purpose of the statute as authorized by an Executive Order 
issued by the Chief of Police to dismantle any established campsites.
120
  The plaintiffs 
brought claims under the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition on the criminalization of 




¶43 The court held that the Eighth Amendment extended protection to conduct integral 
to status.
122
  However, it diverged from the reasoning of the Jones court and other district 
courts that held that anti-camping ordinances violated the Eighth Amendment.
123
  Instead, 
                                               
115 Id. at 1135 (―[F]ive Justices in Powell understood Robinson to stand for the proposition that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the state from punishing an involuntary act or condition if it is the unavoidable 
consequence of one's status or being.‖). 
116 Id. at 1120. 
117 Id. at 1137.  In Pottinger v. City of Miami, the plaintiffs also brought a successful Eighth Amendment 
claim.  The district court found that ordinances that criminalized life sustaining activities constituted cruel 
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment by criminalizing ―involuntary conduct that is 
inextricably related to that status.‖  Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1992).  The 
court emphasized that the plaintiffs ―[had] no realistic choice but to live in public places.‖  Id.  
118 Anderson v. Portland, No. 08-1447-AA, 2009 WL 2386056, at *1 (D. Or. July 31, 2009) (citing P.C.C. 
§ 14A.50.020 (A)(1)). 
119 Id.   
120 Id. at *2. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at *6–*7 
123 Id. at *6; see also Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1362 (11th Cir. 2000); Pottinger v. City of 
Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1564 (S.D. Fla.1992). 
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the Anderson court demanded that, in order to be found unconstitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition on the criminalization of status, the targeted conduct must be 
involuntary, sufficiently related to the status, and the court must examine the extent to 
which the ordinance in question criminalizes ―conduct that society has an interest in 
preventing.‖124 
¶44 After applying this rubric, the court then found that the ―City's enforcement of the 
anti-camping and temporary structure ordinances criminalizes them for being homeless 
and engaging in the involuntary and innocent conduct of sleeping on public property‖ and 
therefore the plaintiffs stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment and survived the 
motion to dismiss.
125
  While the Oregon court accepted the plaintiff‘s Eight Amendment 
claim, it imposed more stringent requirements than previous courts by limiting 
Robinson‘s applicability to both involuntary and innocent behavior.126 
iv) Lehr v. City of Sacramento 
¶45 Another district court, however, recently rejected any expansion of the Robinson 
doctrine and held that even criminalization of broad categories of behavior almost 
exclusively associated with homelessness are not unconstitutional because these 
criminalizations apply to conduct, and not being homeless itself.
127
  In Lehr v. City of 
Sacramento, the district court for the Eastern District of California granted summary 
judgment for the City of Sacramento on an Eighth Amendment challenge to the city‘s 
anti-camping ordinance.
128
  The plaintiffs, a diverse group of homeless people and 
advocates, challenged the city‘s application of its anti-camping ordinance as a violation 
of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of the criminalization of status.
129
  The city‘s 
ordinance criminalized ―camping,‖ which was defined expansively as camping or living 
outdoors on all public property.
130
  Among the city‘s stated rationales for the statute were 
protection of public health, welfare, and safety, and the protection of private property and 
the ―lawful and ordinary‖ uses for which the spaces were intended.131 
¶46 The court rejected the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in the then-vacated Jones 
decision.  It found that the reach of Robinson and Powell was limited only to status and 
did not extend to conduct society has an interest in preventing, or derivative conduct of 
any kind.
132
  The court concluded that because the statute at issue targeted conduct and 
did not punish homeless people for being homeless, it was not unconstitutional under the 
Eighth Amendment as a matter of law.
133
 
                                               
124 Anderson, 2009 WL 2386056, at *7. 
125 Id.  In addition, the court denied the defendants‘ motion to dismiss under the Equal Protection Clause, 
but granted it for the plaintiffs‘ right to travel, freedom of movement, and substantive due process claims.  
Id. at *8–*10. 
126 Id. 
127 Lehr v. City of Sacramento, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
128 Id.  The court denied the defendants‘ motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs‘ claims under the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Id. at 1235–36. 
129 Id. at 1222.   
130 Id. at 1224–25.  
131 Id. at 1225. 
132 Id. at 1231–32. 
133 Id. at 1234.   
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G. Conclusions 
¶47 Of the few jurisdictions that have analyzed anti-camping ordinances under the  
Robinson doctrine, few have accepted the theory.
134
  In Joel v. City of Orlando, for 
example, the Eleventh Circuit rejected homeless plaintiffs‘ claim that an anti-camping 
ordinance unconstitutionally criminalized status.
135
  The court found that even if the 
Robinson doctrine extended to behavior integral to status, as the Pottinger court had held, 
camping was not such a behavior because there was sufficient shelter space to house the 
city‘s entire homeless population.136  In addition, these types of challenges have been met 
with criticism from commentators who have suggested that enjoining ordinances that 
criminalize conduct integral to homelessness creates a slippery slope when drawing the 
line regarding what kind of conduct can be prohibited.
137
 
¶48 The Eighth Amendment jurisprudence surrounding homelessness limits the relief 
the homeless can obtain from statutes that exclude them from public space.  Rather than 
prohibit statutes that target homeless behavior (standing, sitting, and particularly sleeping 
in public areas), the courts have only struck down this kind of government action when 
the homeless would be effectively banished if a statute were allowed to stand.
138
  Even 
those cases that result in a win for the homeless plaintiffs do so only in the limited 
context of involuntariness. 
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS: CITIZENSHIP AND LIBERTY 
¶49 Having considered the legal landscape of anti-homeless measures and the litigation 
challenging them, this Comment will now turn to a discussion of the theoretical 
frameworks that inform its analysis.  This Section will focus on theories of citizenship 
from Thomas Humphrey Marshall‘s essay Citizenship and Social Class and the work of 
Kathleen Arnold on homelessness and citizenship.  These theories give an extra-legal 
context for homelessness and help to delineate the consequences of the way in which the 
legal system deals with homelessness, beyond wins and losses in court.  Through these 
theories, this Comment will argue that even when homeless people win in court, they are 
denied full membership in their communities and excluded from what it means to be a 
citizen. 
A. Thomas Humphrey Marshall: Citizenship and Social Class 
¶50 In 1949, sociologist Thomas Humphrey Marshall authored a seminal article on 
citizenship theory entitled Citizenship and Social Class.
139
  While his article dealt 
specifically with the development of citizenship in Great Britain, his theoretical 
framework proved influential in the development of citizenship theory generally.  While 
                                               
134 See, e.g., Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2000); Joyce v. City & County of S.F., 846 
F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
135 Joel, 232 F.3d at 1362. 
136 Id. 
137 See Gardner, supra note 105. 
138 See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006); Anderson v. Portland, No. 08-
1447-AA, 2009 WL 2386056, at *7 (D. Or. July 31, 2009); Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1561 
(S.D. Fla. 1992). 
139 THOMAS HUMPHREY MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS (1950). 
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this theoretical framework is primarily sociological, not legal, it bears parallels to the 
legal theories of citizenship, discussed briefly below.
140
 
¶51 Marshall frames his issue by attempting to define the interactions and parallels 
between social class and citizenship, beginning with economist Alfred Marshall‘s essay 
The Future of the Working Classes.
141
  In discussing Alfred Marshall‘s work, Thomas 
Humphrey Marshall states: 
Such, I think, is the sociological hypothesis latent in Marshall‘s essay.  It 
postulates that there is a kind of basic human equality associated with the 
concept of full membership of a community or—or, as I should say, of 
citizenship—which is not inconsistent with the inequalities which 
distinguish the various economic levels in the society.  In other words, the 
inequality of the social class system may be acceptable provided the 
equality of citizenship is recognized.
142
 
¶52 Building off of Alfred Marshall‘s ―latent hypothesis,‖ T.H. Marshall sets out the 
principle question he wishes to answer: ―Is it still true that basic equality, when enriched 
in substance and embodied in the formal rights of citizenship, is consistent with the 
inequalities of social class?‖143 
¶53 Marshall defines three elements that create citizenship: civil, political, and social 
rights.
144
  Civil rights are comprised of ―the rights necessary for individual freedom.‖145  
Political rights involve the right to exercise political power, to hold political office, or to 
elect a person to office.
146
  Marshall‘s definition of the social element of rights is 
somewhat more nebulous, but is basically analogous to positive liberties.
147
  Marshall 
refers to social rights as ―the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic 
welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the 
life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.‖148 
¶54 Marshall traces the development of civil rights in the Eighteenth Century to the 
recognition of the right to work: ―In the economic field the basic civil right is the right to 
work, that is to say the right to follow the occupation of one‘s choice in the place of one‘s 
choice, subject only to legitimate demands for preliminary technical training.‖149  The 
idea of economic independence is essential to Marshall‘s conceptualization of citizenship 
                                               
140
 See infra text accompanying note 157. 
141 MARSHALL, supra note 139, at 8. 
142 Id. (emphasis added). 
143 Id. at 9.  Marshall also sought to explore the relationship of the free market and basic equality and the 
shift from an emphasis on duty-based citizenship to rights-based citizenship.  Id. 
144 Id. at 10. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 11. 
147 Positive liberties refer to the right to some benefit (such as welfare or education), whereas negative 
rights refer to the right to be free from government intrusion or abuse.  See David Abraham, Are Rights the 
Right Thing? Individual Rights, Communitarian Purposes and America’s Problems, 25 CONN. L. REV. 947 
(1993).  The United States‘ guarantees of rights are usually described as a system of negative liberties.  See 
Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1189 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., concurring) (―[T]he 
Constitution (with immaterial exceptions) is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties.‖). 
148 MARSHALL, supra note 139, at 11. 
149 Id.at 15–16. 
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and is extremely important to the discussion of the relationship between homelessness 
and citizenship.  Once liberty is linked to economic status, the exclusion of those without 
real property or a steady income from the national identity is guaranteed. 
¶55 Marshall ties the development of political rights to the nineteenth century.  
Political rights did not involve the creation of new rights, but the distribution of existing 
rights to broader sectors of the population.
150
  The suffrage act in the twentieth century 
solidified political rights as rights of citizenship along with civil rights.
151
  The right to 
political participation was the last element of modern citizenship recognized for men in 
England.  While political and civil rights developed in a different sequence for different 




¶56 Finally, Marshall discusses the development of social rights beginning in the 
nineteenth century and culminating in the twentieth.
153
  There existed a division between 
the rights of citizens on the one hand, and social rights and their position as an alternative 
to, rather than as a guarantee of citizenship, on the other.
154
  Under the Poor Law and 
other similar statutes, a person taking advantage of the protection of the government was 
forced to forfeit civil and political rights.  Those that took advantage of the Poor Law 
were interned in workhouses (eliminating the ability to choose one‘s occupation, 
Marshall‘s idea of the quintessential civil right) and lost franchise and other political 
rights that they had.
155
  Early improvements to working conditions were limited to 
protections for women and children, who did not hold citizenship.  Those who enjoyed 
full citizenship had to forgo the protection of the government.
156
  
B. Social Class and Citizenship in the United States 
¶57 Marshall‘s definition of citizenship in terms of civil and political rights parallels 
the basic nature of full citizenship in the United States.
157
  The Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution ties citizenship directly to civil liberties.
158
  The Fifteenth 
                                               
150 Id. at 19. 
151 Id. at 20. 
152 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the 
Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002) (discussing the development of citizenship for women in the United 
States through the Nineteenth and Fourteenth Amendments—in other words, political and civil rights). 
153
 MARSHALL, supra note 139, at 21–22. 
154 Id. at 24. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 24–25. 
157 Marshall tracks the development of citizenship from civil to political to social rights.  This timeline is 
certainly not universal.  Women‘s liberties in the United States, for example, developed in a different order.  
As Marshall points out, women had social rights before they had rights of citizenship.  In addition, women 
gained political rights before they gained civil rights.  However, it is the structure of the theory, and not its 
historical development in a particular place, on which this Comment builds. 
158 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.  No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
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Amendment links it to political liberties.
159
  The structure of citizenship under the 
Constitution follows Marshall‘s framework, and enforces the dual concepts of civil and 
political liberties as defining citizenship.  The struggle of black Americans during the 
nineteenth century to gain civil and political equality is synonymous with a struggle for 
citizenship, which these Reconstruction Amendments recognized. 
¶58 For homeless people, social rights still bear a high cost in the United States.  
Homeless people are often forced to participate in social programs that relieve the more 
tangible challenges they face, but deny them membership within collective identities and 
communities that constitute elements of citizenship.  Similarly, legal decisions that 
depend on a finding of involuntary homelessness deprive the homeless of the economic 
independence that is a foundational element of citizenship.  Courts insist that the 
homeless be without economic options before they are willing to strike down laws that 
criminalize homelessness or conduct incident to homelessness.
160
  While it may be 
reasonable to argue that the bounds of the Constitution and the Eighth Amendment in 
particular limit the courts‘ discretion in addressing issues of homelessness, it is 
nonetheless true that homeless plaintiffs must function within a system in which to be 
homeless is either to be a criminal or to be a charity case, neither of which is compatible 
with citizenship.  Marshall argues that economic independence is a central civil right and 
the foundation of citizenship.  Dependence on the state has historically been an indicator 
of being less than a citizen.
161
  Requiring homeless people to accept the charity of the 
state denies them the right to occupy their time as they choose.  If the choice between 
sleeping outside and sleeping in a shelter is eliminated, by being required to sleep in a 
shelter, homeless people become a group that does not enjoy independence or the full 
rights of the rest of the community. 
¶59 Perhaps the most relevant portion of Marshall‘s essay is his exploration of the 
relationship and conflict between citizenship and social class.  Marshall defines 
citizenship briefly as ―a status bestowed on those who are full members of a 
community.‖162  ―All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and 
duties with which the status is endowed.‖163  In contrast, social class is a ―system of 
inequality.‖164  While it would seem that social class and universal citizenship would be 
incompatible within a governmental system, Marshall instead argues that the equalization 




¶60 The development of governmental methods to deal with the ―more unpleasant‖ 
aspects of social inequality legitimized social inequality.
166
  Welfare programs that 
                                               
159 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (―The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.‖). 
160 See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006); Anderson v. Portland, No. 08-
1447-AA, 2009 WL 2386056, at *7 (D. Or. July 31, 2009); Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1561 
(S.D. Fla. 1992). 
161 MARSHALL, supra note 139, at 24. 
162 Id. at 28. 
163 Id. at 28–29. 
164 Id. at 29. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 32. 
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provided the bare minimum of support prevented the poor from complaining that they 
were denied rights and allowed a system of inequality to continue.  Rather than 
eliminating class distinctions, these class-abatement measures enforced a system of social 
class and, by eliminating its most objectionable elements, minimized the potential for 
criticism of it.  Furthermore, governmental aid was not a benefit of citizenship, but a 
replacement for it.  By employing social benefits or rights to eliminate social inequality, 
the government took on what had traditionally been the role of private charities.
167
  The 
social benefit was bestowed not as a matter of right, but out of benevolence.
168
 
¶61 Instead of any kind of positive assurance of social equality, civil rights developed 
as the core of citizenship.
169
  Unlike social rights, civil rights were compatible and even 
necessary to the maintenance of social inequalities.  Civil rights granted economic 
independence and freedom to compete in the market economy.
170
  The system of social 
rights informed by economic independence both defined citizenship and perpetuated 
systems of disparate social class.  In a capitalist economy, a full citizen cannot be 
economically dependent on others in society or on the government.  This paradigm, 
however, guarantees nothing more than equality of status.  The shift from disparities of 
status to citizenship, which established one universal status, created a ―foundation of 
equality on which the structure of inequality could be built.‖171  By alleviating or at least 
obscuring the elements of poverty that most starkly demonstrated social injustice, social 




C. National Identity and the Home 
¶62 According to Marshall‘s hypothesis, citizenship is more than legally holding the 
same rights as all other citizens.  Rather, citizenship involves membership in a 
community, or as Marshall states, ―a kind of basic human equality.‖173  The connection 
between citizenship and membership in a community, or more specifically, national 
identity, is developed in both Marshall's work and the work of Kathleen Arnold.
174
  
Arnold‘s book, Homelessness, Citizenship, and Identity, deals with the denial of 
citizenship to the homeless by excluding them from political identities.
175
  Arnold focuses 
on national identity and its connection to the home.
176
 
¶63 First, Marshall discusses national identity as an extension of the community 
membership that is integral to citizenship.  For Marshall, citizenship requires "a direct 
sense of community membership based on loyalty to a [civilization] which is a common 
possession."
177
  National consciousness developed in concurrence with civil rights.  As 
                                               




171 Id. at 34. 
172 Id. at 32. 
173 Id. at 8; see supra text accompanying note 142. 
174 KATHLEEN R. ARNOLD, HOMELESSNESS, CITIZENSHIP, AND IDENTITY: THE UNCANNINESS OF LATE 
MODERNITY (2004); MARSHALL, supra note 139, at 40. 
175 ARNOLD, supra note 174. 
176 Id. at 35. 
177 MARSHALL, supra note 139, at 40–41. 
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civil rights expanded and were enjoyed by a greater number of people, a collective 
identity also developed as a result of the benefits of those rights.
178
  Marshall notes that a 
lack of political power prevented collective identity from translating into social equality 
immediately, but instead was used as a collective bargaining tool by unions.
179
  The 
national identity that developed allowed citizens, particularly workers, to use civil rights 
as a tool in the economic sphere.  Collective bargaining, based not just on free market 
economic forces but on collective identity and rights, allowed workers as a class to 
demand social rights as a matter of entitlement.
180
  The same concept translates more 
broadly to the political sphere.
181
 
¶64 Arnold, like Marshall, finds that economic independence is essential to 
citizenship.
182
  For Arnold, the formal elements of citizenship are either birthright 
citizenship or blood citizenship and political membership in a sovereign system to the 
exclusion of other groups.
183
 
¶65 Building on this last category, Arnold also identifies less legalistically formal 
elements of citizenship.  Nationalism or national identity is embodied in a "homogenous 
ideal" under which those representing difference are othered.
184
  Movements challenging 
that homogeneity are thought to infringe upon national identity rather than representing 
another facet of it.  Historically, the exclusion from the ideal (whether national identity or 
political or economic power) has been legitimized by defining ―others‖ as naturally unfit 
for political participation or citizenship.
185
  This theory is compatible with Marshall's 
analysis of social rights.
186
  Those who require support (from the state, from their 
husbands, from their parents, etc.) are denied the same status granted to autonomous, 
economically independent sector of the citizenry.
187
  Under Arnold‘s and Marshall‘s 
theories, membership in national identity has become inextricably linked with citizenship. 
¶66 Like Marshall, Arnold also ties autonomy to citizenship.188  For example, laws 
designed to protect women may paradoxically result in restricting women‘s autonomy, 
thus denying them full citizenship.
189
  For Arnold, having a home is a precondition for 
freedom and a ―symbol of self and self-identity.‖190  Regardless of the home's actual 
ability to provide stability or privacy, it is symbolic of the homogenous ideal.
191
  Arnold 
postulates that the growing of homelessness might actually solidify the line drawn 
between citizens and the homeless because concepts of the home/homeland are 
constructed to exclude, and national identity depends on ―the other.‖192 
                                               
178 Id. at 41. 
179 Id. at 42. 
180 Id. at 43. 
181 Id. at 44. 
182 ARNOLD, supra note 174.  
183 Id. at 35. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 38. 
186 See supra notes 153–156. 
187 Id. 
188 ARNOLD, supra note 174, at 43. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 58. 
191 Id. at 60. 
192 Id. at 137 
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¶67 For Arnold, the solution to the ―othering‖ of the homeless and to their systemic 
exclusion from citizenship lies in shifting the concepts of ―home.‖  Arnold insists on a 
more fluid definition of ―home,‖ and as a result, of ―us.‖193  The politics of homelessness, 
that Arnold suggests, would loosen the connection between the home and national 
identity and give the homeless a voice in the political process.
194
 
IV. DEPRIVATION OF CITIZENSHIP 
¶68 Under the legal structures discussed above, the homeless are legally disabled in a 
number of ways.  They are restricted in the rights they can exercise and in the resources 
they can access.  Lack of property in and of itself is a lack of liberty.
195
  By virtue of 
being without real property (owned or rented) the homeless are outside of the whole 
system of property rights and their protections.  Additionally, rights that seem 
unconnected to property are also diminished or eliminated based on a lack of 
homeownership.  For example, because the homeless do not possess a traditional 
dwelling, their right to privacy will never carry the same weight as a homeowner‘s.  The 
homeless will always be more vulnerable to police searches and seizures, and the 
activities in which they can engage will be diminished.
196
  In the context of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, a reasonable expectation of privacy may exist outside of the 
home,
197
 but privacy expectations are always greater in a residence.
198
  Despite the 
Supreme Court‘s admonition in Katz v. United States that the Fourth Amendment applies 
to people, not places, certain places are afforded less protection.  For example, there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields,
199
 but the area surrounding a house is 
entitled to extra protection.
200
  Therefore, the space of homeless people receives less 
constitutional protection.  The Fourth Amendment rights of the homeless are less 
meaningful. 
¶69 Lack of a traditional residence also diminishes the right and the ability of the 
homeless to participate in the political process.  States implement residency duration 
requirements, mailing address requirements, and/or identifying documentation 
requirements in order to vote.  Some states strike voters who fail to respond to mailed 
confirmations from their voting lists.
201
  While a home cannot be a legal requirement in 
                                               
193 Id. at 161. 
194 Id. at 61. 
195
 See Jane B. Baron, Homelessness as a Property Problem, 36 URB. LAW. 273, 287 (2004). 
196 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  While the Supreme Court has held since Katz that 
the Fourth Amendment ―protects people, not places,‖ id. at 351, there is always a greater expectation of 
privacy for homes.  See also Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (delineating the extent of the curtilage, or 
the area immediately surrounding the home that is afforded the heightened protection of the home); Kyllo 
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (disallowing the use of technology to expose details of a home that 
would otherwise have been concealed). 
197 See Katz, 389 U.S. 347. 
198 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (―At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] 
stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion.‖). 
199 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984)  
200 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987); Oliver, 466 U.S. 170. 
201 THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROGRAM OF THE NAT‘L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, VOTER 
REGISTRATION AND VOTING: ENSURING THE VOTING RIGHTS OF HOMELESS PERSONS (2008), available at 
http://www.nlchp.org/content/pubs/2008_Voting _Report _final2.pdf; see also NAT‘ LAW CTR. ON 
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order to vote, these legal obstacles often effectively eliminate the ability of the homeless 
to participate in the voting process in practice.  Both civil and political liberties, then, are 
diluted for those who do not have homes. 
¶70 Despite the serious limitations that these obstacles pose to both the civil and 
political rights of the homeless, they are not traditionally viewed as eliminating the rights 
or citizenship of the homeless.  Because the United States has developed a system of 
rights, based exclusively on negative liberties, failure to exercise a right or the inability to 
exercise a right is not seen as eliminating it.  Even if a right is meaningless to an entire 
group, at least in part because of the actions of the state, as long as the state does not 
eliminate or infringe upon the right facially, the rights of that group are not considered to 
have been violated.  The First Amendment right to free speech is not a right to speak but 
a right against government infringement on speech.  The Fourteenth Amendment right to 
equal protection does not guarantee that protected classes will receive the same 
compensation, employment, or educational attainment.  It only guarantees that the 
government will not deliberately prevent protected classes from engaging in certain 
activities.  In addition, the United States does not guarantee a right to food, water, 
housing, education, or many other benefits.
202
  Rights are defined by a lack of 
government involvement, and that is all any person is entitled to, no matter what 
conditions result in his or her inability to exercise that right successfully.  Nonetheless, 
the practical and even definitional limitations that the legal structure imposes on the 
rights of the homeless place them in a position of arguing for hollow rights or for second-
class citizenship at best. 
¶71 In addition, the de facto limitations on civil and political rights of the homeless 
deny citizenship to the homeless in more subtle ways.  Under Marshall‘s and Arnold‘s 
theories, economic independence is an essential component of citizenship.
203
  A lack of 
economic independence coupled with a total exclusion from political and national 
identity results in non-citizenship.  The homeless are essentially stateless.  Their lack of 
economic independence and of a home removes them from the political process.  Not 
only are the homeless excluded from civil and political rights, but our conception of the 
―us‖ entitled to those rights, in other words citizens, also excludes the homeless.  
Criminalizing sleeping in public spaces, for example, delegitimizes the voice of the 
homeless, the people who would sleep in public spaces, in the political process.  The 
politics of such a statute only considers the uses of those spaces by, for example, business 
people, dog walkers, or picnickers who will then return to their private residences.  Public 
space is only public for those who have houses.  Those who do not may be excluded, not 
only from public space itself, but from the very definition of ―public.‖ 
¶72 Court decisions that refuse to provide relief from the criminalization of 
homelessness underpin the home as central to membership in local and national 
communities.  By sanctioning cities‘ prohibition of all behaviors associated with 
homelessness, the courts sanction the exclusion of the homeless not only from cities‘ 
parks and sidewalks, but from their citizenry.  In Lehr v. City of Sacramento, the City of 
                                                                                                                                            
HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, PHOTO IDENTIFICATION BARRIERS FACED BY HOMELESS PERSONS: THE 
IMPACT OF SEPTEMBER 11 (2004). 
202 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
203 See supra text accompanying notes 169–171. 
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Sacramento made all living or camping outdoors, in all public spaces, a crime.
204
  The 
city explicitly stated its intention to exclude homeless people from the community when 
it defined the homeless‘s use of public space as not ―lawful and ordinary.‖205  The city 
was willing to ensure, through the use of a criminal code, that the homeless‘ existence 
remained outside of normalized and state-sanctioned uses of public space.  If living 
outdoors is criminal, only those with a home may be included in the law-abiding 
citizenry, and only their uses of public space are ―lawful and ordinary.‖206  The homeless 
are fundamentally not lawful, ordinary, or part of the ―us‖ that uses public space in state-
sanctioned ways.  The state does not include the homeless when providing protections for 
those ―ordinary‖ citizens.  Instead, the homeless are grouped with criminals, simply 
because they do not possess homes. 
¶73 Rather than undermine the denial of citizenship to the homeless, even those cases 
that are ostensibly in their favor tend to reinforce their exclusion from political 
identity.
207
  In a negative rights paradigm, citizenship is conditioned on the forfeiting of 
social benefits.
208
  As a result, the legal solutions that have been most successful in 
disturbing the laws that threaten the rights of the homeless to exist within certain spaces 
are unsuccessful in upsetting a paradigm that perpetually defines them as something less 
than citizens.  Eighth Amendment challenges to anti-camping measures that assert an 
unconstitutional criminalization of status have not all been successful.  Even when they 
have, courts have universally demanded that behavior like sleeping be involuntary before 
they will hold that it is integral to the status of homelessness.
209
  In Anderson, for 
example, the court found that anti-camping ordinances are unconstitutional under the 
Eighth Amendment if there is insufficient shelter space for all of the homeless people in 
the city.
210
  While this decision prohibits the physical exclusion of the homeless from 
public space under certain circumstances, it endorses a regime of symbolic exclusion.  
Cities are still allowed to criminalize all behavior associated with homelessness.  They 
may define homelessness as fundamentally othered and outside of public spaces.  They 
may eliminate any agency the homeless have within the political sphere. 
¶74 Underlying the rationale in this and other similar decisions is the idea that behavior 
integral to homelessness can be criminalized if there is some kind of social rights scheme 
that provides, for example, housing available to the homeless.  This scheme does not 
have to be provided by the state.  The statistics that courts consider in determining 
whether or not there is enough shelter space available to the homeless do not distinguish 
                                               
204 Lehr v. City of Sacramento, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (E.D. Cal. 2009); see supra discussion accompanying 
notes 127–133. 
205 Lehr, 624 F. Supp. 2d at 1225. 
206 The blame for the exclusion of the homeless from the ―public‖ does not rest solely with the judiciary.  
Courts are constrained by legislation, precedent, and the structure of the judiciary itself.  Indeed, as 
discussed above, conceptions of national identity and ―us‖ contribute as much to this exclusion as much 
any other factor.  See supra Section III.C.  However, the courts‘ role is to legally approve the exclusion of 
the homeless as full citizens, and in that way courts are complicit in the denial of citizenship to the 
homeless. 
207 See, e.g., Anderson v. Portland, No. 08-1447-AA, 2009 WL 2386056, at *7 (D. Or. July 31, 2009). 
208 See supra text accompanying note 154. 
209 See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006); Anderson, 2009 WL 2386056, at 
*7. 
210 Anderson, 2009 WL 2386056, at 1. 
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between private and public shelter space.
211
  A person who chooses not to enter a shelter 
because of religious beliefs, an opposition to its policies, or fear of their own safety has 
no recourse under the Eighth Amendment.
212
  The homeless still may not choose to use 
public space.  Instead, they are forced to accept social benefits as alternatives to full 
citizenship and autonomy. 
¶75 The homeless are left in the untenable position of choosing between arrest and 
criminalization by a system that excludes them from community, national and political 
identity, and the proverbial ―us,‖ and surrendering full citizenship to accept ―benefits‖ not 
extended to the economically independent and propertied.  Court decisions striking down 
ordinances under the Eighth Amendment create temporary solutions for the 
criminalization of the homeless, but are complicit in the system that fails to include the 
homeless in citizenship and perpetually others them. 
¶76 Under Anderson, the homeless may not make any meaningful decision regarding 
where they will sleep or live.
213
  They may not use public space in the ways that they 
would choose to as members of the public, but only as wards for whom the state has 
failed to provide.
214
  They have no more rights, no greater membership, and no more 
agency than the plaintiffs in Lehr.
215
  The court gives them space (or at least the potential 
for space), but in a system that insists on real property as a requisite for membership, it 
cannot give them full citizenship. 
¶77 The relationship between property and liberty figures heavily in this analysis.  In 
the United States, the connection between property and liberty is especially close because 
of the extent to which our system has developed around negative liberties.  The United 
States guarantees numerous freedoms from government intrusion, but rarely guarantees, 
as a fundamental liberty, some governmental benefit.
216
  This negative liberty regime 
ensures that economic independence remains a central tenet of citizenship and that what 
might otherwise be considered positive or social rights instead remain alternatives to 
citizenship.  Courts are undoubtedly confined by this regime in making decisions, and 
have further confined themselves to decisions that are unable to address the structural 
issues that drive the interaction between homelessness and citizenship. 
¶78 However, courts are not completely unable to help change the structures that 
exclude the homeless from citizenship and national identity.  The court in Pottinger came 
closest to recognizing the homeless as legitimate citizens and not outside of what is 
normal in its discussion of the plaintiffs‘ Fourth Amendment claims.217  That court stated:  
[T]he interior of the bedrolls and bags or boxes of personal effects 
belonging to homeless individuals in this case is perhaps the last trace of 
privacy they have. In addition, the property of homeless individuals is 
                                               
211 See Jones, 444 F.3d at 1121 (9th Cir. 2006). 
212A man who refused to apply for shelter space for religious and security reasons was not granted relief 
under the Eighth Amendment.  Lehr v. City of Sacramento, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1233 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
213 See Anderson, 2009 WL 2386056, at *7.   
214 Id. 
215 Lehr, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1220. 
216 See cases cited supra notes 64–65. 
217 Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).   
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¶79 Rather than depending on normalized expectations of what traditional residences 
are to determine when a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Pottinger 
court credited the plaintiffs‘ use of alternative spaces as ―home‖ or areas to be 
safeguarded and constitutionally protected.
219
  This decision marks a step in the right 
direction for including the homeless in citizenship.  The kind of respect the Pottinger 
court gave to the plaintiffs‘ alternative living situations has not appeared in Eighth 
Amendment challenges.  Furthermore, courts may be reluctant to apply the Eighth 
Amendment because of the limits of the Robinson doctrine.  However, if the courts begin 
to acknowledge alternative living situations as protectable or as ―homes,‖ citizenship may 
begin to lose its too-tight bond with traditional residences and the homeless may begin to 
be included in what we identify as ―us.‖ 
V. CONCLUSIONS: THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 
¶80 Solutions to the othering of the homeless are much more difficult in a system that 
rests on concepts of negative liberties.  Particularly because the United States is 
fundamentally tied to a negative liberty regime, positive liberty solutions that guarantee 
certain benefits as part of, rather than instead of, citizenship may be unlikely.
220
  
Transforming social rights from a position of defining sub-citizenship to part of the 
definition of full citizenship would represent a structural shift for the American 
governmental system.  In addition, unless political identity shifts along with positive 
rights strategies and parallel shifts in judicial decisions, these measures will continue to 
act as social rights that are alternatives to citizenship. 
¶81 One interesting effect of the economic crisis, and particularly the rise in 
foreclosures, may be to enact such a shift in our conceptualizations of ―us.‖  The crisis 
has created new homeless who, until recently, owned homes and were undoubtedly 
included in our national identity.
221
  Under the current economic conditions, it has 
become more difficult to draw self/other lines when it comes to homelessness.  People 
with steady jobs and families who, until recently, owned their own homes, are now living 
in shelters or in their cars.
222
  As the result of broad economic problems, both our concept 
of ―us‖ and our concept of ―home‖ may shift.  This crisis of identity may help to create 
more fluid conceptualizations of ―us‖ and allow homeless people to be embraced as full 
citizens. 
¶82 Shifting the concept of ―home‖ in legal and social contexts will be difficult.  As 
this Comment argues, the legal structures that affect the homeless are difficult to 
                                               
218 Id. at 1572. 
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220 Many commentators have suggested a positive rights-based approach to solving the problems of 
criminalizing the homeless.  See, e.g., Casey Garth Jarvis, Homelessness: Critical Solutions to a Dire 
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221 See Peter S. Goodman, Foreclosures Force Ex-Homeowners to Turn to Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 
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challenge in court.  Even those challenges to anti-homeless laws that are successful often 
accept the dominant discourse that excludes the homeless from national identity or any 
part in ―the public.‖  Under the theories of Marshall and Arnold, the Eighth Amendment 
decisions that grant the homeless relief exclude them from autonomous citizenship at the 
same time.  The laws that infringe on the ability of the homeless to sleep, sit, stand, and 
even be in a city are never seen as laws infringing on members of the citizenry.  Instead, 
these statutes are acceptable unless they eliminate the last option of the homeless.  Only 
then will the courts step in, and even then they do not suggest that the homeless must be 
included in what it means to be public, but merely that if there are no other options the 
homeless may not be excluded from all public space.  These statutes, decisions, and the 
discourse that informs them, place the homeless outside of ―the public‖ and deny them 
effective citizenship.  The economic crisis may help to shift what it means to be part of 
―the public‖ away from the home.  Finally, courts may also be able to contribute to such a 
shift by legitimizing alternatives to traditional residences as worthy of legal protection. 
